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CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-DUTY OF JUDGE TO INSTRUCT ON LESSER AND IN-
CLUDED CRIMES-Appellant was one of four defendants who were charged in 
three separate counts of an indictment with the crimes of attempted robbery 
in the first degree, attempted grand larceny in the first degree, and assault 
in the second degree with intent to commit robbery and grand larceny. After 
all the evidence had been entered, the trial judge submitted only the count 
of attempted robbery to the jury, instructing them that they return a verdict 
of guilty or not guilty of that crime. The defense excepted to the court's 
refusal to submit the other counts charged in the indictment. The defend-
ant was found guilty of attempted robbery, and the verdict was affirmed by 
the appellate division.1 On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, 
affirmed, three judges dissenting. The court is required only to instruct 'on 
a lesser or included crime when there is some basis in the evidence for 
finding the accused innocent of the larger crime and guilty of the lesser one. 
People v. Mussenden, 308 N. Y. 558, 127 N.E. (2d) 551 (1955). 
1 People v. Mussenden, 284 App. Div. 479, 131 N.Y.S. (2d) 701 (1954). 
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Since the majority of courts hold that the trial judge must charge on 
lesser and included offenses only when he finds some evidence which would 
allow a jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser crime,2 most challenges 
of the judge's instructions are in cases where the jury has convicted of the 
major crime without being given the alternative of lesser counts.3 However, 
often a defendant convicted on a lesser crime will appeal, alleging that he 
should be found guilty of the major crime or completely innocent.4 The 
latter cases are most common in the minority of jurisdictions which provide 
that instructions must always be given on lesser and included crimes.5 New 
York statutes allow a defendant to be convicted of any lesser and included 
crimes,6 but since the judge instructs the jury on the law7 the jury's power 
to so convict exists only when the judge finds some evidence of the lesser 
crime. The minority view, by requiring instructions on all counts, leaves 
the matter entirely to the jury.8 Either rule may violate the principle that 
the jury should try the facts and the judge prescribe the law. The minority 
risks the danger that a jury, although it finds facts sufficient to prove 
the defendant guilty of the major crime, will nevertheless convict him of 
a lesser offense.9 Although this tendency can probably never be eliminated 
entirely, the majority view reflects a desire to discourage it by refusing to 
charge concerning lesser crimes when there seems to be no view of the 
facts which would warrant such a verdict.10 The difficulty with the majority 
2 E.g.: State v. McCall, 245 Iowa 991, 63 N.W. (2d) 874 (1954); State v. Mele, 140 Conn. 
398, 100 A. (2d) 570 (1953). See 21 A.L.R.. 603 (1922). 
3See People v. Martens, 272 App. Div. 1022, 73 N.Y.S. (2d) 604 (1947); State v. Brown, 
(Mo. 1952) 245 S.W. (2d) 866. 
4 See Sanders v. Commonwealth, (Ky. App. 1954) 269 S.W. (2d) 208; Laury v. State, 
187 Tenn. 391, 215 S.W. (2d) 797 (1948). 
5 Laury v. State, note 4 supra; State v. Broussard, 217 La. 90, 46 S. (2d) 48 (1950). 
La. R.ev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1954) tit. 15, §386, specifies the included offenses for each 
crime and states that the court must charge on these included offenses when the greater 
crime is charged in the indictment. An interesting history of two unsuccessful attempts 
to amend this statute and the reasons for their defeat is given in Bennett, "Criminal Law 
and Procedure: Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term," 7 LA. L. 
R.Ev. 288 at 311 (1946). For another statute of this same type, see Tenn. Code Ann. 
(Williams, 1934) §11751. 
6 Section 444 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure states that, upon an in-
dictment for a crime which has different degrees, the jury may convict of any degree or of 
any attempt to commit the crime. Section 445 states that in all other cases a jury may 
convict of any crime necessarily included in the crime charged in the indictment. 66 N.Y. 
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §§444, 445. In the principal case, the majority and 
minority disagreed as to whether the other counts charged in the indictment were "neces-
sarily included" offenses within the meaning of section 445. Principal case at 561, 568. 
7 See People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220 (1934). 
8 The Supreme Court of Louisiana has reversed a conviction of first degree murder 
because of the trial judge's refusal to charge the jury on attempted murder and attempted 
manslaughter. State v. Brown, 214 La. 18, 36 S. (2d) 624 (1948). 
9 These reasons can work against the defendant as well as for him. Although the jury 
will often convict a defendant of a lesser count because of sympathy, etc., it is also true 
that a jury which has some doubt as to the guilt of the defendant charged with a major 
crime may compromise and sentence him on a lesser and included crime instead of 
acquitting him. 
10 In People v. R.ytel, 284 N.Y. 242, 30 N.E. (2d) 578 (1940), .the court spok~ of the 
power of the jury to reject uncontradicted evidence and extend mercy to the accused. 
Certainly the majority view detracts from this power. 
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view is that in virtually every case there is some view of the facts which 
would legally warrant a conviction of a lesser crime.11 Although there 
would be little support for a rule allowing a judge to instruct the jury that 
they could not acquit the defendant, the difference between such a situa-
tion and the majority view is only one of degree. Essentially both require' 
the judge to withdraw one possible factual situation from the deliberation 
of the jury on the ground that the judge's findings show no evidence which 
he feels would allow the jury to arrive at that particular factual determina-
tion. If allowing the judge to limit the jury"s choice of verdicts assures a 
greater degree of justice in most cases, this preemption of jury power 
should not be hidden behind vague distinctions between questions of law 
and questions of fact. Further, the courts should, on general principles, use 
extreme care in restricting this fact finding power of the jury.12 In the 
principal case, the New York courts decided a factual question-whether or 
not there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find the defendant inno-
cent of the major crime and guilty of a lesser one. By a four-to-three deci-
sion the highest court in the state decided that there could not be any view 
of the facts which would allow conviction of the lesser crime. It would ap-
pear that when this court disagrees four to three as to the conclusiveness•of 
the evidence, that in itself is sufficient indication that the evidence is not 
so conclusive as to justify the trial court in refusing to submit the lesser 
crimes to the jury. 
Paul A. Heinen, S. Ed. 
11 Application of the felony-murder rule, for example, illustrates a fact situation 
which would legally justify a jury in convicting of a lower degree than first degree 
murder: X, without deliberation or premeditation, feloniously assaults Y and Z's death 
results. A cha:rge to the jury that they should either find X innocent of the assault or 
guilty of first degree murder is inappropriate. If the jury finds that X assaulted Y without 
intent to kill, they should convict him of first degree murder under the felony-murder 
rule. However, if they find that X assaulted Y with intent to kill then the statute pre-
scribes a conviction of second degree murder as a result of the transferred intent. REPORT 
OF THE NEW YORK !.AW REvISION COMMISSION 683 (1937). 
12 See People v. Schleiman, 197 N.Y. 383, 90 N.E. 950 (1910), where the court points out 
that only exceptional conditions warrant a refusal to instruct the jury on their power to 
convict of a lesser degree of the crime charged, and that such an instruction should be 
given unless there is no possible view of the facts which would allow any choice except 
a conviction of the major crime or an acquittal. 
